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Financialization, income distribution, and aggregate demand in the USA 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the effects of financialization and functional income distribution on 
aggregate demand in the USA by estimating the effects of the increase in rentier income 
(dividends and interest payments) and housing and financial wealth on consumption and 
investment. The redistribution of income in favor of profits suppresses consumption, whereas 
the increase in the rentier income and wealth has positive effects. A higher rentier income 
decreases investment. Without the wealth effects, the overall effect of the changes in 
distribution on aggregate demand would have been negative. Thus a pro-capital income 
distribution leads to a slightly negative effect on growth, i.e. the USA economy is moderately 
wage-led.   
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1. Introduction 
The notion of financialization covers a wide range of phenomena: the deregulation of 
the financial sector and the proliferation of new financial instruments, the increase in 
household debt, the development of the originate-and-distribute model of banking, the 
emergence of institutional investors as major player on financial markets, the boom (and bust) 
in asset markets, shareholder value orientation and changes in corporate governance (of non-
financial business), and a spectacular rise of incomes in the financial sector and of financial 
investments.
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 This paper aims at exploring how some of these changes have affected 
aggregate demand in the USA. Thereby we focus on three dimensions of the various effects of 
financialization on the macro economy: i) the effects of increased payments to the rentier, i.e. 
interest and dividend payments out of profits, on investment, ii) the effects of the increased 
rentier income on consumption, iii) the effects of the housing and financial asset prices on 
consumption. 
The USA is a particularly interesting case to analyze these effects. Financialization is 
in many respects most developed in the USA. Looking at the stylized facts, several puzzles 
arise. First, the USA has experienced a consumption-led boom since the mid-1990s, as can be 
seen in the rise of consumption/GDP in Figure 1. At the same time a change in income 
distribution in favor of the profit share has occurred (Figure 2). If we accept the standard 
assumption that the marginal propensity to consume out of profits is lower than that out of 
wages, this raises a first puzzle: why has consumption increased despite a declining wage 
share? The USA experienced a stock market boom in the 1990s and bust in the early 2000s 
and a housing price boom (that is collapsing at the time of writing). Net financial wealth and 
housing wealth (Figure 3) show wide swings and the associated wealth effects are often 
thought to explain changes in consumption behavior. Second, since the 1980s, there is a sharp 
decline in the gross private investment/gross operating surplus ratio (Figure 4). Thus another 
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puzzle arises: given that profits have increased, why has investment not increased in parallel? 
In the same period, there have been significant changes in the composition of profit income. 
Since the 1980s there has been a jump in the share of the rentier income, i.e. net interest and 
dividend payments, as a ratio to total profits (Figure 5). The increase in rentier income was 
first due to the increase in interest rates in the 1980s, and after the decline of the interest rates 
in the 1990s, the increase in dividend payments helped to hold the rentier share at high levels. 
As a consequence the non-rentier profit income (gross operating surplus minus net interest 
and dividend payments) as a ratio to GDP follows a completely different pattern than the 
profit share in the 1980s (Figure 6); the fall throughout the 1960s and 70s is not followed by a 
major recovery during the post-1980s.   
Figures 1-6 
This paper aims at explaining these puzzles regarding the increase in consumption and 
the stagnation in investment during a period of pro-capital redistribution of income in the 
USA by integrating the effects of financialization. The basic model is a version of the model 
presented by Bhaduri and Marglin (1990). It is a general Post-Kaleckian macro model, where 
a pro-capital income distribution can have positive as well as negative effects on aggregate 
demand according to the relative size of the consumption differential out of wage vs. profit 
income, the sensitivity of investment to profits, and the sensitivity of net exports to unit labor 
costs. Thus the demand regime can be wage-led or profit-led. The theoretical contribution of 
this paper is to extend the basic model by incorporating the effects of financialization on 
aggregate demand in an open economy context. We then econometrically estimate the effects 
on changes in income distribution and financialization on consumption, investment, and net 
exports. In a nutshell our interpretation is the following: The redistribution of income in favor 
profits at the expense of wages is expected to suppress consumption. However the 
redistribution from non-rentier profits to rentier income has increased consumption due to a 
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higher marginal propensity to consume out of rentier income. The wealth effects of the 
increase in housing and financial asset prices led to an increase in consumption, even if the 
debt mechanism proved, with the advantage of hindsight, unsustainable. At the same time a 
higher rentier income suppresses investment through both lower investable funds available to 
the firm and shareholder value orientation.   
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model. Section 3 
summarizes the empirical literature. Section 4 presents the estimation results. Section 5 
concludes. 
2. Wage-led vs. profit-led demand and financialization 
This section presents the theoretical model that incorporates the effects of 
financialization into a Post-Keynesian model based on Bhaduri and Marglin (1990). In this 
model profit-led as well as wage-led demand regimes are possible because an increase in the 
wage share will stimulate consumption but dampen investment. The question which of these 
effects is larger becomes an empirical one. In an open economy additional effects will operate 
through net exports. Net exports depend negatively on unit labor costs, which are negatively 
related to the profit share. We focus on a private demand only.  
Financialization affects macroeconomic activity through households‘ consumption 
behavior as well as investment. Financialization also affects distribution, , however in this 
paper we take distribution to be exogenously determined; but to avoid endogeneity problems, 
we use only lagged values of distribution as explanatory variable.  
2.1 Consumption 
The relevance of income distribution in a consumption function is that the propensity 
to consume out of wages (W),
wc , is higher than that out of profits (R), c . Thus consumption 
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is expected to decrease when the profit share in income (Y), 
Y
R
 , rises. Consumption, C, 
can be modeled as 
YccYccC ww  )(0        
(Equation 1) 
The first effect of financialization on consumption is due to a redistribution of income 
in favor of the rentier. We define the rentier income share, r , as the net interest and dividend 
payments as a ratio to GDP, and the non-rentier profit share, 
nr , 
as the gross operating 
surplus minus net interest and dividend payments as a ratio to GDP.
2
 Our hypothesis is that 
the marginal propensity to consume out of rentier income, 
rc , is higher than that out of non-
rentier profit income, 
nrc . However we still expect that wr cc  .   
The second effect of financialization on consumption is the wealth effect. In the 1990s 
the wealth effect in the consumption function has been rediscovered, motivated by the 
increase in private consumption expenditures in the USA, which was attributed to the rise in 
the value of financial assets during the stock market boom. In the late 1990s a 5% marginal 
propensity to consume out of financial wealth was often quoted (with some more qualification 
for European countries; e.g. Boone et al. 1998). After the stock market crash in 2000, the 
unabated consumption boom was then explained by booming house prices. Several studies 
claimed to find substantially higher marginal propensity to consume out of property wealth 
than out of financial assets (Case et al 2001; Catte et al. 2004; Girouard et al. 2006), since 
residential property is more frequently accepted as collateral. Furthermore Cynamon and 
Fazzari (2008) and Brown (2008) discuss the role of changing social norms in explaining the 
unprecedented increase in consumption led by household debt. As wages have stagnated in 
many countries, but consumption norms have increased, many households have been driven 
into debt. The potentially positive effects of higher wealth on consumption are also taken into 
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account in recent post-Keynesian theoretical models of Boyer (2000), Lavoie and Godley 
(2001-2), Skott and Ryoo (2008), and van Treeck (2007). 
Disaggregating π as 
r  and nr , and integrating the wealth effect, by distinguishing 
net financial wealth, FW, and gross housing wealth, HW, of households, the extended 
consumption function becomes 
 HWcFWcYccYccYccC HWFWnrwnrrwrw    )()(0  
(Equation 2) 
The expectation regarding wealth effects is that  0 FWHW cc . We use gross housing 
wealth instead of housing wealth net of mortgages in order to better reflect the debt channel 
backed by rising house prices. However in order to capture the possible future contractionary 
effects of debt, we use net financial assets, i.e. financial wealth minus liabilities, which 
include also the mortgages. Bhaduri et al. (2006) argue that the wealth effect may even turn 
negative beyond a point due to increased interest payments and risk of default. Godley and 
Lavoie (2007), Hein and van Treeck (2008), Dutt (2006), and Palley (1996) also point at this 
conflicting flow and stock effects of higher debt. Furthermore because of high debt levels, the 
fragility of the economy to the possible shocks in the credit market increases, as is being 
observed now after the financial crisis.  In this paper we take the debt and wealth 
accumulation as exogenous; so our model involves the effects of future debt payments 
through exogenously changing income distribution and net financial wealth.   
Another important aspect of financialization has been the increase in the share of 
managerial wages, which has been documented by Piketty and Saez (2003) for the USA. We 
expect that the marginal propensity to consume out of managerial wages is also lower than 
that out of the rest of the wages. However these data exist only at annual frequency and for 
econometrical reasons we prefer to use quarterly data, and thereby we are unable to include 
managerial wages in our estimations.  
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2.2 Investment 
In the basic Bhaduri-Marglin model investment is a positive function of output, which 
is the standard accelerator effect, and the profit share, which is a proxy for expected 
profitability as well as the availability of internal finance. So investment, I, is expressed as 
iYiiI YA 
       
(Equation 3) 
where Ai  is autonomous investment, and all the parameters are expected to be positive.  
One of the most important effects of financialization on investment behavior is due to 
the increased role of shareholders in the firm (Boyer, 2000; Stockhammer, 2004, 2005-6). 
Lazonick and O‘Sullivan (2000) argue that a shift in management behavior from ‗retain and 
reinvest‘ to ‗downsize and distribute‘ has occurred. Financial market-oriented remuneration 
schemes based on short-term profitability increased the orientation of management towards 
shareholders‘ objectives.   
We again disaggregate the profit share as r  and nr
3
, and rewrite the investment 
function:  
rrnrnrYA iiYiiI   
      
(Equation 4) 
Our hypothesis is that 0nri
 
and 0ri . We suggest that the appropriate variable to 
capture the effect of profitability on investments is 
nr rather than  , since it reflects the 
available internal funds of the firm for investment. The expected negative effect of r
indicates the significance of the shareholder value orientation in suppressing investment 
beyond its direct negative effect on the investable funds.
4
 The negative effect of higher 
dividend or interest payments on investment is also incorporated in the theoretical Post-
Keynesian models by Hein (2006, 2007, 2008a, b), Lavoie (1995, 2008), Lavoie and Godley 
(2001-2), van Treeck (2007), and Skott and Ryoo (2008). The models by Skott and Ryoo 
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(2008) and van Treeck (2007) also include the effects of the leverage ratio and Tobin‘s q. 
Higher dividends and share buybacks increase firms‘ dependence on debt as well as share 
prices and thereby Tobin‘s q. We do not include the Tobin‘s q for both theoretical and 
empirical reasons. Empirical evidence has failed to support the q theory (Ford and Poret 1991, 
Chirinko 1993, Medlen 2003). Theoretically, it is unclear why an increase in Tobin‘s q, which 
is primarily an outcome of share buybacks and increasing dividend payments in the 2000s 
would lead to rising investment (Hein, 2008b).  
Two caveats of our investment function can be mentioned. First, the debt stock is also 
not included explicitly in our model; thus the effect of debt on investment is incorporated 
through the exogenously changing interest payments. Second, as a consequence of 
financialization firms also face a higher degree of uncertainty, which may make physical 
investment projects less attractive (Carruth et al. 2000, Stockhammer and Grafl, 2008). This is 
ignored here. 
2.3 Total effects on aggregate demand  
The effect of a change in the profit share on total private demand will depend on the 
effects on consumption, investment, and net exports: 














 NX
iicccc
Y r
r
nr
nr
r
wr
nr
wnr )()(
  
(Equation 5) 

Y
 is private excess demand, that is, the change in demand caused by a change in 
income distribution given a certain level of income.
5
 The sign of 

Y
 is ambiguous and 
depends on the relative magnitude of the effect of distribution on consumption, investment, 
and net exports, where 0)()( 





r
wr
nr
wnr cccc  and 0



r
ri , but 0



nr
nri  and 
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0



NX
. If the total effect is positive (∂Y/∂π>0), the demand regime is called profit led, and 
if ∂Y/∂π<0, it is called wage led. If the reaction of consumption to an increase in the profit 
share is strong due to high consumption differentials, and if the share holder value orientation 
effect on investment is high compared to the positive effect of an increase in nr , and the 
positive effects of   on net exports are low, then demand will be wage-led. Thus if 











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NX
iicccc nrnr
r
r
r
wr
nr
wnr )()( , then the economy is wage-led.  
 Next we discuss the effect of a redistribution in favor of rentier income and at the 
expense of non-rentier profits with a constant  , thus the case where nrr   . The 
effect on private excess demand will be: 
 
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(Equation 6) 
If 









r
r
nr
nr
r
wr
nr
wnr iicccc  )()( , then a pro-rentier redistribution of 
income at the expense of the non-rentier profits is decreasing private demand, thus it is 
contractionary. The effect of such redistribution on investment is unambiguously negative. 
The effect on consumption is positive, if





r
wr
nr
wnr cccc )()(  . A pro-rentier 
redistribution of income at the expense of the non-rentier profits can be expansionary, if the 
positive effect on consumption is high enough to more than offset the negative effect on 
investment.  
Our expansionary case is similar to the ―intermediate‖ case in Hein (2008b) and van 
Treeck (2007), where the effect of financialization on the accumulation rate is negative, 
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although the effect on capacity utilization and consumption is positive.
6
 This differs from the 
finance-led regime of Boyer (2000), where financialization also has a positive effect on 
accumulation. 
The effect of a pro-rentier redistribution of income at the expense of wage income 
with a constant nr  is however unambiguously negative.  
Finally the positive wealth effects can enhance the possibility of expansionary effects 
of financialization along with a rising profit share. However the sustainability of these 
expansionary effects is questionable. But the issue of sustainability is only indirectly captured 
here, as we treat financial variables as exogenous. 
3. Empirical literature  
There are a number of contributions on the identification of the demand regime based 
on the basic Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) model. However, empirical work on the effects of 
financialization on the demand regime is rather limited, despite the increasing amount of 
theoretical work on financialization.  
The tests of the basic Bhaduri-Marglin models can be grouped into two estimation 
strategies. The first group of papers tries to estimate the full model, that is, a goods market 
equilibrium relation and a distribution function. Stockhammer and Onaran (2004) estimate a 
structural VAR model for the USA, UK and France, where they conclude that the impact of 
income distribution on demand and employment is very weak and statistically insignificant. 
Onaran and Stockhammer (2005-6) employ a similar model for Turkey and Korea and find 
some indication for wage-led demand regimes in these countries. Barbosa-Filho and Taylor 
(2006) estimate a VAR with demand and distribution equations for the USA economy. The 
effects for individual components of demand are then decomposed from the aggregate results 
(rather than estimated as behavioral equations). They find that the USA has a profit-led 
demand regime. However the results by Barbosa-Filho and Taylor (2006) suffer from several 
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econometric problems due to autocorrelation problems, lag structure, and the specification, 
therefore they cannot be regarded as robust (Stockhammer and Stehrer 2008). 
The second, larger group of papers analyses the goods market in isolation. Typically 
behavioral functions are estimated for consumption, investment and net exports. The first 
paper along these lines was Bowles and Boyer (1995), who find that France, Germany, and 
Japan are profit-led, and the UK and the USA are wage-led. Naastepad and Storm (2007) for 
eight and Hein and Vogel (2008) for six OECD countries are more recent examples.  All of 
them use annual data and look at long run effects. Naastepad and Storm (2007) find a profit-
led regime in the USA and Japan, and a wage-led regime in the other countries. The profit-led 
effect is primarily due to a very strong investment effect; the effect of distribution on exports 
is negligible, and the effect on imports is ignored. Hein and Vogel (2008) find wage-led 
regimes in the USA, France, Germany, and the UK, and profit-led regimes in Austria and 
Netherlands. Their findings about the profit-led regimes are due to very low or insignificant 
effects of the profit share on both investment and net exports. Stockhammer, Onaran, Ederer 
(2009) for the Euro area offer a more sophisticated treatment of international trade by 
estimating separate price, import and export equations. They find a wage-led regime in the 
Euro area. Stockhammer, Hein, Grafl (2009) find a wage-led regime for Germany.  
The literature discussed above does not include control variables for financialization 
effects. If financialization has affected consumption and investment behavior, then the results 
summarized above are biased. Empirical literature in terms of integrating the effects of 
financialization in the estimations of demand regimes is until now limited to Hein and Ochsen 
(2003), who estimate the effect of the interest rate within a post-Kaleckian growth model for 
several OECD countries for the period of 1960-1995. Rather than actual interest payments 
(which are not readily available for most countries) they multiply the interest rate with the 
nominal capital stock and assume that this amount is distributed to the households. This proxy 
will differ from actual interest payments because not the entire capital stock is debt-financed 
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and the interest rates on commercial credit typically differ from interest rates for government 
bonds. Van Treeck (2008), Orhangazi (2008), and Stockhammer (2004) estimate only the 
effect of financialization on investment. Stockhammer (2004) uses rentier income of non-
financial business as a proxy for shareholder value orientation and finds that financialization 
may explain a substantial part of the slowdown in accumulation; but the results vary widely 
across countries. Van Treeck (2008) estimates the effect of the interest and dividend payments 
on private non-financial investment in the USA for the period of 1965-2004, and finds that 
both variables of financialization have a negative effect. However, the profit share itself is 
insignificant. Orhangazi (2008) finds negative effects of financialization on investment in the 
US for the period of 1973-2003 using firm level data. 
In this paper we address several caveats of the existing literature on the effect of 
financialization on demand: we incorporate the financial and housing wealth effects on 
consumption. We disaggregate the effects of the rentier share and the non-rentier profit share 
on investment. We discuss the overall effects on private demand in the open-economy 
context, in order to make our results comparable to the former estimations of the basic open 
economy Bhaduri-Marglin model. 
4. Empirical results  
The model is estimated by means of separate single equations for consumption, investment, 
exports, and imports. We are using quarterly data for the period of 1960:1-2007:4. Variable 
definitions can be found in the Appendix (Table A.1). For econometric reasons all variables 
enter the estimation in logarithmic form. Unit root tests suggest that all these variables are 
integrated of order one I(1). Following standard practice in modern econometric modeling, we 
first checked the applicability of the error correction models (ECM), and where there was no 
indication of cointegration, a general autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) model in 
difference form was used.  We start from a general model including eight lags of the 
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variables, but no contemporaneous values to avoid endogeneity problems, and gradually 
reduce the number of the lags by dropping the most insignificant lag and repeating the 
estimation until only significant variables remain. In all equations reported below Breusch-
Godfrey test for autocorrelation fail to reject the null-hypothesis of no serial correlation. We 
estimate the basic Bhaduri-Marglin specification as well as the extended model with the 
effects of financialization. 
4.1 Consumption  
For the convenience of estimation and calculation we divide both sides of the 
consumption function in Equation 1 by GDP, Y
7
: 
 )(
0
ww cc
Y
c
c
Y
C
        (Equation 7) 
The ECM specification did not give statistically significant results. Specification 1 in 
Table 1 reports the regression results for the ADL specification in difference form for the 
basic specification (), The hypothesis that consumption propensities vary between profit and 
wage income is confirmed.
8
 Since the estimation is in logarithmic differences, we have to 
convert the elasticity into a marginal effect. At the sample mean the difference in the marginal 
propensity to consume out of wages and profits is 0.17.
9
   
Table 1 
Specification 1 may suffer from omitted variables due to the absence of the effects of 
financialization. Next we estimate the extended consumption function as in Equation 2. Again 
dividing both sides by Y, the equation to be estimated becomes 
Y
HW
c
Y
FW
ccccc
Y
c
c
Y
C
HWFWnrwnrrwrw    )()(
0
       
(Equation 8) 
Specification 2 in Table 1 shows the results for equation 8. After cointegration tests 
failed to indicate cointegration,
10
 distributed lag model in difference form was adopted. 
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Calculating the marginal effects, we find a differential in marginal propensity to consume 
between the wage and non-rentier profit income of 0.16 and a differential in consumption 
propensity between the wage and the rentier income of 0.10 at the sample mean. The 
calculation of marginal effects at the sample mean is in Table 2. Thus there is indeed a high 
consumption out of the rentier income. To make the results comparable with the basic 
specification, we take a weighted average of the two consumption differentials (as suggested 
in the first part of Equation 5), and find that the average difference in the marginal propensity 
to consume between the wage and total profit income is 0.14 at the sample mean, which is 
lower than in the basic specification, but the latter ignores the relatively higher marginal 
propensity to consume out of rentier income. Our results are qualitatively similar to those of 
Naastepad and Storm (2007) and Hein and Vogel (2008), but they fail to distinguish between 
rentier and non-rentier profits. The net financial and gross housing wealth has positive 
coefficients. The marginal propensity to consume out of net financial wealth is 0.007 and that 
out of gross housing wealth is 0.02.
 
Both are lower than in conventional estimations, but our 
estimations are in differences, and are not directly comparable to the ECM results of the 
previous studies, which concentrate on wealth effects, but ignore distributional effects.
11
 
12.4% of the change in the consumption share from 1980 to 2007 is explained by changes in 
housing wealth and 5.5% by changes in financial wealth.
12
 
4.2 Investment 
The investment function is first estimated in the basic form (equation 3) in an ECM 
form. The most important result of this estimation is that investment is cointegrated with Y 
but not with the profit share.
13
 This result is robust to the use of the level of real profits 
instead of the profit share. There is no long-run relation between the profit share and 
investment. However this estimation may be biased, since it does not take into consideration 
the effects of payments to the rentier.    
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In order to address this puzzle, we disaggregate the profit share as 
r and nr . 
However the estimation of this revised investment function poses an interesting econometric 
problem: including the profit variables separately we find statistically significant effects, but 
including them simultaneously we obtain economically meaningful effects that are not 
statistically significant. Specification 1 in Table 2 shows the results when both the rentier and 
non-rentier income are included in the cointegrating relation. Although the coefficients are 
statistically insignificant, economically they are indicative: we find an elasticity of 0.22 with 
respect to 
rn
  and -0.14 with respect to r . The corresponding marginal effects are 0.15 and -
0.29 for 
rn
  and r respectively. The overall (weighted) marginal effect of a 1%-point 
increase in the profit share is then 0.03%-point increase in I/Y calculated as in Equation 5.  
Table 2 
Specification 2 of Table 2 reports the results of a restricted ECM model, where the 
long run effect of r  on investment is restricted to zero, and only short-run effects are 
allowed. This indicates a long-run cointegration relation between investment, GDP, and the 
non-rentier profit share. The long-run elasticity of investment with respect to the non-rentier 
profit share is 0.48. The short-run effects of both r  and nr  are in the expected direction. 
Calculating the marginal effect at the sample average shows that a 1%-point increase in the 
non-rentier profit share leads to a 0.33%-point increase in private real investment as a ratio to 
GDP at the sample mean. However since non-rentier profits are only 73.1% of the gross 
operating surplus, a 1%-point shift in income distribution in favor of capital, creates only 
0.24%-point increase in investments as a ratio to GDP. Specification 1 estimates a much 
lower effect of 
rn
  on investment compared to the results of specification 2, but specification 
2 may be misspecified since it restricts the long run effect of r to zero. 
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Alternatively, when we restrict the long-run effect of 
nr to be zero, we find that r  
has a negative long run effect on investment (specification 3 in Table 2). In this specification 
the non-rentier profits, 
nr , have only a short-run positive effect, whereas the rentier income 
share has a positive short-run effect, which is counterintuitive. In this specification the long-
run elasticity of investment with respect to the rentier income share is -0.23, which 
corresponds to a marginal effect of -0.47 at the sample mean.  
Combining the long run marginal effect of 
nr  (0.33%-point based on specification 2) 
and the long run marginal effect of r  (-0.47 based on specification 3), the effect of a rise in 
the gross profit share by 1%-point on investment/GDP is 0.12%-point. Rather than working 
with a single point estimate we will proceed by noting that the effect of a 1%-point increase 
on the profit share on I/Y lies between 0.03%-points and 0.12%-points. Table 3 summarizes 
the calculation of the marginal effects for r  and nr  
and corresponding weighted marginal 
effect of the profit share on investment for the three different specifications. The marginal 
effects with a constant elasticity calculated at different period averages are discussed below in 
Section 4.4. We also checked whether the elasticities are changing for different sub-periods, 
but the results were insignificant or implausible. 
This overall low effect of the gross profit share on investment is in line with the 
literature on aggregate investment functions, which usually finds a lower profit elasticity of 
investment (Chirinko 1993), compared to firm-level investment functions, which usually find 
a larger effect of cash flow on investment (Fazzari and Mott 1986). Our specification that 
addresses financialization by disaggregating the profit share as non-rentier profits and rentier 
share is an improvement compared to the recent empirical work on the USA in the tradition of 
the Bhaduri-Marglin model, e.g. Hein and Vogel (2008), van Treeck (2008), and 
Stockhammer and Onaran (2004), who find no effect of the aggregate profit share on 
investments. 
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Multiplying the marginal effects with the actual change in the rentier and non-rentier 
profit shares, we can explain 29-49% of the actual decline in investment/GDP. 
Table 3   
Demand is playing a key role in determining investment expenditures, again in 
accordance with the literature (Chirinko 1993, Ford and Poret 1992). The accelerator effects 
are well above one, i.e. the marginal effect of a 1% increase in GDP increases 
investment/GDP ratio by 1.3-1.4%-point in the long run.  
The real interest rate is not included in the estimations since the effect of the interest 
payment on investable funds is captured by disaggregating profits as non-rentier and rentier 
profits. Another important function of the interest rate in mainstream investment functions is 
however to capture the effect of cost of capital relative to labor; our estimations does not 
capture this relative cost effect on investment. When we include the (ex post) real long-term 
interest rate in the ECM specification, it had a (statistically significant) positive, i.e. perverse, 
long-run effect on investment.   
4.3 Net exports 
To estimate the effects of distribution on net exports we follow the stepwise approach 
of Stockhammer, Onaran, Ederer (2009) and estimate imports and exports as functions of 
export and import prices (and a demand variable), and domestic prices and export prices as 
functions of nominal unit labor costs and import prices. The estimated effect of nominal unit 
labor costs (ULC) on domestic prices allows us to calculate by how much an increase in real 
unit labor costs raises domestic prices.
14
  
Table 4 summarizes the estimation for the domestic price deflator as a function of the 
nominal ULC and import prices. Table 5 shows the estimation for export prices as a function 
of domestic prices and import prices. Both estimations were performed in difference form 
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after ECM specifications proved unsuccessful. An increase of nominal unit labor costs by 1% 
increases domestic inflation by 0.21 and export prices by 0.31.   
Table 4, 5, 6, 7 
Table 6 summarizes the estimation results for exports as a function of export prices 
relative to import prices, and the trading partners‘ GDP, which is the real GDP of the OECD 
minus the GDP of the USA. Since no support for a cointegrating relation was found, the 
equation was estimated in difference form. The elasticity of exports with respect to relative 
prices is -0.16, however it is statistically insignificant. In the import equation, the explanatory 
variables are export prices relative to import prices, and the real GDP of the USA. Although 
the ECM model was applicable in this case, we choose to estimate the import equation in 
difference form in order to be consistent with the other equations. Table 7 reports the 
difference specification. The elasticity of imports with respect to relative prices is 0.56. 
Table 8 shows the calculation of the effects of an increase in the profit share on 
exports and imports at the sample average. The total effect of a change in profit share on 
exports includes the effect of real unit labor costs on nominal ULC
15
, the effect of nominal 
ULC on prices, the effect of prices on export prices, and the effect of export prices on exports. 
Then this value has to be transformed from an elasticity into a marginal effect.
16
 A similar 
procedure is followed for imports. Overall an increase in the profit share by 1%-point 
currently leads to an increase in exports by 0.005%-points of GDP and a decline in imports by 
0.02 %-points of GDP. So the marginal effect of an increase in the profit share on net exports 
is 0.024%-points at the sample average. As the economy becomes more open, the net export 
effect is growing gradually up to 0.04%-points for 2002-07.  
Table 8 
Comparing our results with the previous work of Hein and Vogel (2008), who do not 
find any significant effect of the profit share on net exports based on a single equation 
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estimation for net exports, we conclude that our stepwise approach is important. Indeed 
Naastepad and Storm (2007), who only estimate the effects on exports, also find an export 
elasticity of 0.16 with respect to the profit share. 
4.4 Total effects 
Table 9 combines the partial effects of a pro-capital redistribution on consumption, 
investment, and the net exports. Here we also calculate different marginal effects for the mean 
values for each business cycle.   
The results with the basic specification without disaggregating the profit share would 
indicate a clearly wage-led economy due to the negative consumption effect (the first column 
of Table 9) and the lack of positive effects on investment. Overall our basic specification 
indicates that a 1%-point increase in the profit share leads to 0.14%-point decline in total 
private excess demand as a ratio to GDP at the sample mean.  
Table 9 
Taking into account the effects of financialization, the economy is still wage-led at the 
sample mean, but the magnitude of the effect is more moderate. Depending on the 
specification of the investment function, our estimations suggest that a 1%-point increase of 
the profit share leads to a decrease of private domestic excess demand by 0.03 to 0.11%-point 
of GDP at sample means. The major improvement compared to the basic specification is the 
presence of significant effects of the profit share on investment; however since the positive 
effects of the non-rentier profits are partly offset by the negative rentier share effect, the 
investment effect remains still modest compared to the negative consumption effect. The 
result is not very different for sub-periods, but the domestic economy becomes slightly less 
wage-led during 1975-82, and the effect increases again gradually in line with the declining 
effect of profits on investment, and the relatively stable marginal effect on consumption
17
. 
When the effects of foreign trade are also considered, the effect of a 1%-point increase in the 
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profit share leads to a decline of total private excess demand by 0.004-0.088%-point of GDP 
at the sample mean. The lower bound of the estimate is however almost zero, indicating little 
effect of distribution on private excess demand. When the marginal effects are calculated for 
sub-periods, the effect of distribution on demand becomes smaller as the economy becomes 
more open. The effect of an increase in the profit share lies between +0.006%-point and -
0.073%-point at the mean of 2002-07. So the lower bound of the estimates indicates that the 
positive and negative effects of a pro-capital income distribution are by and large cancelling 
each other out. This is consistent with the findings in Stockhammer and Onaran (2004) for the 
USA based on VAR estimations. 
So far we have discussed the effects of a pro-capital redistribution on demand 
assuming an exogenously given share of rentier income within profits. Next we calculate the 
effects of a change in income distribution in favor of the rentier as discussed in section 2.3: 
first we look at the effects of a 1%-point increase in the rentier income share at the expense of 
the wage income, i.e. a constant share of non-rentier profit share. The effects of this scenario 
on consumption and investment are in Table 10a calculated for different sub-periods. The 
marginal effect on consumption at the sample mean is -0.10%-point of GDP and the marginal 
effect on investment ranges between -0.29 and -0.47%-point of GDP, depending on the 
specification of the investment equation. The overall effect of a pro-rentier income 
distribution at the expense of the wage earners on total private domestic demand ranges 
between -0.39 and -0.57%-points at the sample mean. The redistribution in favor of the rentier 
at the expense of the wage earners without a change in the non-rentier profits is more 
contractionary than an increase in the profit share led by both the rentier income and the non-
rentier profits, since the positive effects on investment do not exist anymore.  
Second we simulate the effects of a redistribution from the non-rentier profits to 
rentier income; thus a 1%-point increase in the rentier income share and a 1%-point decline in 
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the non-rentier profit share with a constant wage share. The results are in Table 10b. At the 
sample mean the effect on consumption is an increase of 0.06%-point as a ratio to GDP. The 
effect increases gradually, and peaks during 1983-91, and is 0.09%-points during 2002-07.  
The investment effect is on the contrary highly negative. The total effect on investments is a 
decline of 0.44-0.80%-points at the sample mean. This negative effect is decreasing through 
time. Overall the total effect on private domestic excess demand at the sample mean ranges 
between -0.38 and -0.74. The redistribution of profit income in favor of the rentier at the 
expense of the non-rentier profits creates the highest contraction effects due to very strong 
negative investment effects. 
Table 10 
Finally we evaluate the overall effects of financialization. The increase in housing 
wealth, which alone contributes to a 1%-point increase in consumption/GDP, has a strong 
expansionary effect. The decline in the non-rentier profit share also led to a slight increase in 
consumption, and this and the positive wealth effects more than offset the negative effect of 
the increase in the rentier income share at the expense of the wage share, leading to an 
increase in consumption/GDP. Both the decline in the non-rentier profits and the increase in 
the rentier share led to a decline in investment/GDP. The effect of pro-capital redistribution 
on net exports remained modest. Thus it is fair to say that the positive and negative effects of 
financialization offset each other, and the regime is not finance-led or expansionary, but also 
not strongly contractionary.   
5. Conclusion 
This paper analyses the effect of financialization on aggregate demand for the case of 
the USA based on an extended Post-Kaleckian macro model. We find that the primary 
redistribution of income in favor of the rentier income as well as the non-rentier profits at the 
expense of wages suppresses consumption; however the secondary redistribution of profits in 
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favor of the rentier income has a positive effect on consumption. The wealth effects of rising 
housing and financial asset prices on consumption also lead to an increase in consumption. A 
higher rentier income suppresses investment through both lower investable funds available to 
the firm and shareholder value orientation, and an increase in non-rentier profits has a positive 
effect on investment. However the overall effect of a pro-capital redistribution on investment 
is modest. As a result the USA economy is moderately wage led, however the lower bound of 
the estimate is almost zero, indicating little effect of distribution on private excess demand; 
thus the positive and negative effects of a pro-capital income distribution are almost 
cancelling each other out.   
The results suggest that the changes in functional income distribution and wealth 
effects in the era of financialization have had an overall neutral effect on aggregate demand. 
But without the wealth effects, the overall effect on consumption and investment would have 
been negative. Thus the macro economy is not finance led (in the sense of Boyer 2000) while 
still being shaped by changes in the financial sector. The effects of financialization regarding 
income distribution at the expense of wage earners, the consequent reliance on debt fuelled by 
the housing bubble to maintain consumption, and growth based on low physical investment 
has led to a risky and fragile economy. This is exactly the mechanism, which underlies the 
financial crisis of 2007-09. The coming years will show the negative consequences of debt 
repayments and the bust of the housing bubble on consumption. Indeed over the longer term, 
if the negative wealth effects of the bust phase are also incorporated, the overall consequences 
of financialization for growth may prove to be significantly negative. An alternative scenario 
with an improving wage share and declining rentier share would provide a sounder and more 
sustainable basis for growth.  
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Figure 1: Consumption/GDP Figure 2: Gross Operating Surplus/GDP 
Figure 3: Gross Housing Weath/GDP and Figure 4: Gross Private Domestic Investment/
Net Financial Wealth(financial assets-liabilities)/GDP Gross Operating Surplus 
Figure 5: Net dividend & interest payments/ Figure 6: Gross Operating Surplus-dividends-interest pay.
Gross Operating Surplus /GDP 
Quaterly data from 1960:1 to 2007:4. See Appendix 1 for data sources and definitions.
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Table 1: Regression results for consumption    
       
Equation: 1 2 
Dependent Variable: Δ C/Y  Δ C/Y  
Estimation period: 1962:2 - 2007:4 1962:2 - 2007:4 
Variable coefficient t-stat. coefficient t-stat. 
const 0.00 ** 2.11 0.00 ** 2.34 
Δ C/Yt-1 -0.41 ** -4.74 -0.41 ** -4.96 
Δ C/Yt-2 -0.21 ** -2.30 -0.17 ** -2.45 
Δ C/Yt-8 0.14 *  1.66      
Δ πt-1 -0.12 ** -3.02      
Δ πt-4 -0.09 ** -2.31      
Δ πt-5 0.09 ** 2.38      
Δ FW/Yt-7     0.03 ** 2.97 
Δ HW/Yt-2     0.06 *  1.81 
Δ πnr t-1     -0.09 ** -3.36 
Δ πr t-1     -0.08 ** -3.41 
Δ πr t-2     0.06 ** 2.74 
Δ Yt-1 -0.22 ** -3.15 -0.24 ** -3.94 
Δ Yt-2 -0.16 ** -2.19      
Δ Yt-3 0.09 *  1.78      
Δ Yt-8 0.17 ** 2.73 0.12 ** 2.68 
Adj. R2 0.24     0.26     
DW 2.03     2.02     
* & ** stand for 10% and 5% significance levels respectively. 
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Table 2: Regression Results for Investment       
Equation: 1 2 3 
Dependent Variable: Δ I Δ I Δ I 
Estimation period: 1962:2 - 2007:4 1962:2 - 2007:4 1962:2 - 2007:4 
Variable coefficient t-stat. coefficient t-stat. coefficient t-stat. 
const -1.11 ** -2.86 -0.81 ** -3.74 -1.20 ** -3.33 
It-1 -0.21 ** -4.42 -0.20 ** -4.33 -0.19 ** -3.75 
GDPt-1 0.29 ** -4.26 0.26 ** 4.21 0.27 ** 3.65 
πnr t-1 0.04  0.62 0.10 ** 2.00     
πr t-1 -0.03  -0.93     -0.05 ** -2.06 
Δ It-6 0.11 *  1.77 0.11 *  1.77     
Δ It-8 0.23 ** 2.30 0.23 ** 2.31 0.22 ** 2.16 
Δ Yt-1 1.07 ** 2.73 1.01 ** 2.61 1.13 ** 2.86 
Δ Yt-2 1.11 ** 2.91 1.05 ** 2.79 0.97 ** 2.46 
Δ Yt-4 0.75 *  1.82 0.67 *  1.67 0.98 ** 2.46 
Δ Yt-8 -1.48 ** -2.71 -1.53 ** -2.82 -1.33 ** -2.47 
Δ πnr t-1 0.44 ** 2.52 0.44 ** 2.54 0.55 ** 3.00 
Δ πnr t-4 0.44 ** 2.36 0.41 ** 2.25 0.35 *  1.85 
Δ πnr t-5 -0.64 ** -3.54 -0.67 ** -3.69 -0.61 ** -3.36 
Δ πr t-1         0.26 *  1.78 
Δ πr t-2         -0.25 *  -1.74 
Δ πr t-4 0.29 *  1.91 0.26 *  1.73 0.35 ** 2.40 
Δ πr t-5 -0.34 ** -2.37 -0.37 ** -2.62 -0.31 ** -2.17 
Adj. R2 0.32    0.32    0.33    
DW 2.07     2.06     2.07     
* & ** stand for 10% and 5% significance levels respectively. 
 
 
Table 3: The marginal effect of a 1%-point change in the profit share on investment
1962:1-2007:4
Marginal Effect 
(iπnr & iπr) Weighted Marginal Effect
A B C D E F
πnr 0.150 0.330 - 0.110 0.242 -
πr -0.290 - -0.470 -0.078 - -0.126
iπnr(πnr/π)+iπr(πr/π) 0.032
Notes: Column (A) is calculated based on the estimates from Table 3 Specification 1 as described in the text.  
Column (B) is calculated based on the estimates from Table 3 Specification 2.
Column (C) is calculated based on the estimates from Table 3 Specification 3.
Column (D), (E) and (F) calculated based on column (A), (B) and (C). 
The last line of Column D and E-F are calculated as i πnr (π nr /π)+i πr (π r /π)
0.115
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Table 4: Regression results for Price   Table 5: Regression results for Export Prices 
         
Dependent Variable: Δ P  Dependent Variable: Δ PX 
Estimation period: 1962:2 - 2007:4  Estimation period: 1962:2 - 2007:4 
Variable 
coefficien
t t-stat.  Variable 
coefficien
t t-stat. 
const 0.00 ** 2.76  const 0.00  1.23 
Δ ULCt-1 0.05 ** 1.98  Δ ULCt-1 0.25 ** 3.08 
Δ PM t-1 0.04 ** 4.02  Δ ULCt-3 -0.13 * -1.66 
Δ PM t-2 0.03 ** 2.74  Δ PM t-1 0.14 ** 3.32 
Δ PM t-3 0.03 ** 2.57  Δ PM t-3 0.11 ** 3.05 
Δ PM t-8 -0.04 ** -3.75  Δ PX t-1 0.37 ** 4.49 
Δ Pt-1 0.31 ** 4.71      
Δ Pt-4 0.29 ** 4.81      
Δ Pt-6 0.18 ** 3.21      
Adj. R2 0.86      Adj. R2 0.57     
DW 2.04      DW 2.05     
         
         
Table 6: Regression results for 
Exports   Table 7: Regression results for Imports  
         
Dependent Variable: Δ X  Dependent Variable: Δ M 
Estimation period: 1962:2 - 2007:4  Estimation period: 1962:2 - 2007:4 
Variable 
coefficien
t t-stat.  Variable 
coefficien
t t-stat. 
const 0.01 *  1.82  const 0.02 ** 3.54 
Δ YF t-2 1.25 ** 2.56  Δ Yt-1 1.90 ** 6.62 
Δ Y F t-3 1.96 ** 3.67  Δ Yt-2 0.50 *  1.66 
Δ YF t-4 -1.21 ** -2.42  Δ Yt-7 -0.49 *  -1.79 
Δ YF t-6 -1.05 ** -2.17  Δ Yt-8 -0.88 ** -3.06 
Δ PX/PM t-3 -0.19  -1.22  Δ PX/PM t-4 0.52 ** 3.48 
Δ Xt-1 -0.34 ** -5.07  Δ PX/PM t-5 0.30 *  1.90 
Δ Xt-6 0.17 ** 2.45  Δ Mt-1 -0.36 ** -4.76 
     Δ Mt-2 -0.24 ** -3.39 
     Δ Mt-7 0.14 ** 2.02 
Adj. R2 0.22      Adj. R2 0.33     
DW 2.00      DW 1.99     
* & ** stand for 10% and 5% significance levels respectively
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Table 9: The marginal effect of a 1%-point change in the profit share on private demand for different time periods   
  Marginal Effect of 
π on Consumption 
Weighted  
marginal effect of  
πr and πnr on 
Consumption 
Weighted  
marginal 
effect of  
π on 
Investment 
Private Domestic 
 Demand 
Net Exports 
Effect 
Open Economy 
period A B C D E (B+D) F (B+C) G H (E+G) I (F+G) 
1962:2 - 2007:4 -0.165 -0.144 0.032 0.115 -0.029 -0.112 0.024 -0.004 -0.088 
1962:2 - 1970:4 -0.158 -0.136 0.035 0.118 -0.018 -0.101 0.012 -0.006 -0.089 
1971:1 - 1974:4 -0.170 -0.146 0.040 0.135 -0.011 -0.106 0.016 0.005 -0.090 
1975:1 - 1982:4 -0.165 -0.143 0.038 0.132 -0.011 -0.105 0.023 0.012 -0.082 
1983:1 - 1991:4 -0.163 -0.141 0.035 0.120 -0.021 -0.105 0.025 0.004 -0.080 
1992:1 - 2001:4 -0.168 -0.144 0.035 0.118 -0.027 -0.110 0.031 0.004 -0.079 
2002:1 - 2007:4 -0.167 -0.144 0.033 0.112 -0.032 -0.111 0.038 0.006 -0.073 
Notes: The first entries in this table are as follows: Column (A) is Column (A) in Table 2. Column (B) is Column (E) in Table 2.       
Column (C) and (D) are the values in the third row in Columns (D) (Specification 1) and (E-F) (Specification 2+3) in Table 4. Column (G) is  Column (H) in Table 9. 
The other  rows are calculated as marginal effects at the average values for different sub-periods.      
       
  
  
Table 8: Calculation of marginal effects on net export for different time periods, 1962:1-2007:4
The effect of real unit labor cost on X X/Y
The effect of real unit labor cost on M M/Y
A B C D (A*B*C) E F H (-A*B*C*E*F)
Exports 1.27 0.19 -0.16 -0.04 1.47 0.08 0.005
Imports 1.27 0.19 0.56 0.13 1.47 0.10 -0.020
Sum 0.024
Notes: Values in columns (A), (B) and (C) are based on coefficient-estimates in Tables 4, 5, 6, 7 .
1/RULC

 YX /
ulc1
1
ULCP x
e
xMP
e xXP
e
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Table 10a: The effect of a 1%-point increase in the rentier share and a 1%-point decrease in the wage share
Marginal Effect of 
πnr on Consumption
Marginal Effect of 
πr on Consumption
Total 
marginal effect of
π on Consumption
Marginal Effect of 
πr on Investment
Marginal Effect of 
πnr on Investment
period A B C (A+B) D (Specification 3) E (Specification 2) F (Specification 1)
Specification 2+3 
=D+E C+F C+G
1962:2 - 2007:4 0.00 -0.101 -0.10 -0.47 0.00 -0.29 -0.47 -0.39 -0.57
1962:2 - 1970:4 0.00 -0.143 -0.14 -0.67 0.00 -0.41 -0.67 -0.56 -0.81
1971:1 - 1974:4 0.00 -0.124 -0.12 -0.61 0.00 -0.38 -0.61 -0.50 -0.74
1975:1 - 1982:4 0.00 -0.100 -0.10 -0.51 0.00 -0.31 -0.51 -0.41 -0.61
1983:1 - 1991:4 0.00 -0.077 -0.08 -0.35 0.00 -0.22 -0.35 -0.29 -0.43
1992:1 - 2001:4 0.00 -0.088 -0.09 -0.38 0.00 -0.24 -0.38 -0.32 -0.47
2002:1 - 2007:4 0.00 -0.085 -0.09 -0.36 0.00 -0.22 -0.36 -0.31 -0.44
Table 10b: The effect of a 1%-point increase in the rentier share and a 1%-point decrease in the non-rentiers share
Marginal Effect of 
πnr on Consumption
Marginal Effect of 
πr on Consumption
Total 
marginal effect of
π on Consumption
Marginal Effect of 
πr on Investment
Marginal Effect of 
πnr on Investment
period A B C (A+B) D (Specification 3) E (Specification 2) F (Specification 1)
Specification 2+3 
=D+E C+F C+G
1962:2 - 2007:4 0.16 -0.10 0.06 -0.47 -0.33 -0.44 -0.80 -0.38 -0.74
1962:2 - 1970:4 0.13 -0.14 -0.01 -0.67 -0.28 -0.54 -0.95 -0.55 -0.96
1971:1 - 1974:4 0.15 -0.12 0.03 -0.61 -0.34 -0.53 -0.95 -0.51 -0.93
1975:1 - 1982:4 0.16 -0.10 0.06 -0.51 -0.36 -0.48 -0.87 -0.42 -0.81
1983:1 - 1991:4 0.17 -0.08 0.10 -0.35 -0.35 -0.38 -0.71 -0.28 -0.61
1992:1 - 2001:4 0.17 -0.09 0.08 -0.38 -0.33 -0.39 -0.71 -0.31 -0.63
2002:1 - 2007:4 0.17 -0.09 0.09 -0.36 -0.32 -0.37 -0.68 -0.28 -0.59
Notes: The first rows in these tables are as follows: Columns (A) and (B) are calculated based on the marginal effects in Table 2. Columns (D), (E), and (F) are calculated based on the marginal effects in Table 3.    
The other  rows are calculated as marginal effects at the average values for different sub-periods. 
Total Effect of
π on Investment
Private Domestic Demand
Total Effect of
π on Investment
Private Domestic Demand
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Table A.1: Variable definitions
Notation Description source Computation
C Personal Consumption Expenditure, nominal USA National Income 
and Product Accounts (NIPA) Tables*
C/Y Consumption Share USA NIPA Tables* Personal Consumption Expenditure, nominal/
GDP, nominal
I Gross Private Domestic Investment, real
deflated by Investment Price Deflator
USA NIPA Tables
Y GDP, real,
deflated by Gross Domestic Product Deflator
USA NIPA Tables
FW/Y Net Financial Wealth/GDP USA Federal Reserve - 
Flow of Funds Accounts**
(Financial Wealth - Financial Liabilities), nominal/
GDP, nominal 
HW/Y Housing Wealth/GDP USA Federal Reserve - 
Flow of Funds Accounts
Gross Housing Wealth, nominal/
GDP, nominal
π Gross Operating Surplus /GDP USA NIPA Tables
πnr Non-Rentiers Income Share USA NIPA Tables (Gross Operating Surplus - 
Net Dividends - Net interest and miscellaneous payments, domestic industry)/
GDP, domestic industry, nominal
πr Rentiers Income Share USA NIPA Tables (Net Dividends + Net interest and miscellaneous payments, domestic industry)/
GDP, nominal
P Price Index for Gross Domestic Product USA NIPA Tables
ULC Unit Labor Costs USA NIPA Tables Compensation of Employees, received, nominal/
GDP, real
PM Price Index Imports USA NIPA Tables
PX Price Inde Exports USA NIPA Tables
PX/PM Terms of Trade USA NIPA Tables Export Prices/Import Prices
M Imports of Goods and Services, real
deflated by Import Price Deflator
USA NIPA Tables
X Exports of Goods and Services, real
deflated by Export Price Deflator
USA NIPA Tables
YF GDP of OECD Countries (real) minus GDP of USA, 
real
OECD National Accounts***
Note: All Variables are in logarithmic form.  All variables are seasonally adjusted quarterly observations from 1960:1 to 2007:4.
* Source: http://www.bea.gov/National/nipaweb/SelectTable.asp
** Source: http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/data.htm
*** Source: http://puck.sourceoecd.org/vl=7385629/cl=23/nw=1/rpsv/home.htm
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Endnotes 
                                               
1
 References include Boyer (2000), Aglietta and Rebérioux (2005), Epstein (2005), 
Stockhammer (2004, 2008), Palley (2008), Krippner (2005), Lazonick and O‘Sullivan (2000), 
Froud et al (2006). 
2
 This includes the retained earnings as well as proprietors‘ income, depreciation, and taxes. 
Thus it is expected that there is consumption out of proprietor‘s income. 
3
 We use gross private profits since private investments are also gross. 
4
 One could also argue that there is an additional relation between current dividends and 
investments in the future. If firms have pessimistic expectations about the future, they do not 
plan to invest in the next years; therefore they do not retain earnings, but rather distribute 
dividends. However the relation is then between future investments and current dividends, 
since it takes a while for investments to be planned, and therefore do not result in a problem 
of endogeneity for our study.  
5
 In order to find the total effect of a distributional change on Y, this total partial effect of   
on Y has to be multiplied by the multiplier, i.e. 


















Y
G
Y
NX
Y
I
Y
C
1
1
. 
6
 Hein (2008c) and van Treeck (2007) identify contractive (‗normal‘), intermediate, and 
expansive (‗puzzling‘) cases, following Lavoie‘s (1995) model of the effects of the interest 
rate on the capacity utilization, profit, and accumulation. In the contractive case all these 
variables are negatively affected. In the ‗puzzling‘ case all three variables are positively 
affected. 
7
 Both C and Y are nominal values. 
8
 Since the function is estimated in difference form, the cw in the theoretical model is dropping 
out. Thus we can only estimate the differentials in the marginal propensity to consume, and 
not their levels. 
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9
 The elasticity is calculated as the summation of the coefficients of the explanatory variable 
divided by one minus the summation of the coefficients of the lagged dependent variable. The 
conversion from the elasticity of consumption with respect to  , thus Ce , to the marginal 
effect on C for a given Y is as follows: 
R
C
e
YC
C



 /
.   
10
 The ECM specification again did not give statistically significant results. The results are 
available upon request. The t-ratio of the coefficient of adjustment, thus the coefficient of 
Y
C
  is -2.28, which is way below the critical value of 3.67 at the 10% level (see Banerjee et 
al., 1998). The Johansen test also unambiguously rejected cointegration.  Girouard (2001) 
estimates an ECM specification for the USA with financial wealth, housing wealth, and the 
short-term interest rate in the long term relationship, and unemployment as an additional 
short-run control variable, the coefficients have the expected signs, but indeed the t-value of 
the ECM coefficient in two different specifications are -1.8 and -2.6 respectively. Both are 
well below the critical values for a cointegration relation (see Banerjee et al., 1998). 
Moreover, this specification is very sensitive to the exclusion of the interest rate, or the 
unemployment rate. 
11
 OECD (2001) finds that the marginal propensity to consume out of net financial wealth is 
0.03 and that out of gross housing wealth is 0.05 during the period of 1970:1-1999:2 in the 
USA. Our attempts to replicate these estimations suggested that results are extremely 
sensitive to minor changes in the specification. 
12
 The economic significance of the wealth effects are calculated by multiplying the marginal 
effects with the actual changes in 
Y
FW
 
and
 Y
HW
, and take the ratio to the actual change in 
Y
C
. 
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13
 The ECM estimations are available upon request. When the equation is estimated in 
difference form,  has a significant and positive effect with a marginal effect of 0.11 on I/Y; 
however this estimation is biased since it ignores the cointegrating long run relation between I 
and Y. 
14
 We measure the real unit labor costs simply by the wage share, thus 1-the gross profit share 
(1-π).    
15
 
ulcRULC
ULC




1
1
ln
ln
, where ulc is the effect of ULC on domestic prices. For this elasticity 
we use the estimation for the domestic prices. 
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 where ULCPxe is the effect of ULC on export prices, and 
xXP
e is the effect of export prices on exports. The final two terms are to convert the elasticity 
to marginal effect by using the average values for the total sample as well as sub-periods. The 
whole term is multiplied by -1, since the effect of an increase in the profit share is the inverse 
of the effect of an increase in the wage share (i.e. real unit labor costs). 
17
 Through time the difference between the marginal propensity to consume out of wages vs. 
non-rentier profits is increasing, whereas the difference between the marginal propensity to 
consume out of wages vs. rentier income is decreasing gradually. So the opposite trends are 
offsetting each other.  
